This is the second article in a series of two that discusses whether historians are within their professional rights to investigate miracle claims. In the first, I made a positive case that they are and then proceeded to examine two major arguments in support of a negative verdict to the issue: the principle of analogy and antecedent probability. I argued that neither should deter historians from issuing a positive verdict on miracle claims when certain criteria are met and the event is the best explanation of the relevant historical bedrock. In this second article, I examine three additional objections commonly appealed to by biblical scholars: the theological objection, lack of consensus and miracle claims in multiple religions. The resurrection of Jesus is occasionally cited as an example.
INTRODUCTION
The question as to whether historians are within their professional rights when adjudicating on the historicity of miracle claims is a discussion taking place even outside of the community of biblical scholars (Licona 2009 ). In my previous article, I also made a positive case that historians are within their professional rights to adjudicate on the historicity of miracle claims. I defined miracle as an event in history for which natural explanations are inadequate and proposed that we may identify a miracle when the event (a) is highly unlikely to have occurred, given the circumstances and/or natural law and (b) occurred in an environment or context charged with religious significance. When these criteria are met and the reported event is the best explanation of the relevant historical bedrock, the historian is warranted in affirming that a miracle has occurred. I then proceeded to examine two major arguments in support of a negative verdict to the issue: the principle of analogy and antecedent probability. I argued that neither should deter historians from issuing a positive verdict on miracle claims when the above criteria are met and the event is the best explanation of the relevant historical bedrock. In this second article, I will examine three additional common objections to historians adjudicating on miracle claims: the theological objection, lack of consensus and miracle claims in multiple religions.
THEOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS
John Meier contends that although modern scholars are rational to believe in miracles, professional historians cannot assign a judgement of 'historical' to a miracle claim. (Meier 1994:513-514; cf. 521 . See also Allison 2005:350-351 and Wedderburn 1999:96) 1 Meier goes on to explain that after a historian has completed an exhaustive investigation of a possible miraculous event, he may affirm that no reasonable natural cause is known, that the event took place in a context charged with religious significance and that some witnesses claimed, even believed, that it was a miracle. However, his job ends there in his capacity as historian (Meier 1994 :513, cf. Dunn 2003 Evans 2006:139; Johnson 1996:136; Tilley 2003:14) . (Meier 1994:514) .
[I]t is inherently impossible for historians working with empirical evidence within the confines of their own discipline ever to make the positive judgment: "God has directly acted here to accomplish something beyond all human power." The very wording of this statement is theo-logical ("God has directly acted . . ."). What evidence and criteria could justify a historian as a historian in reaching such a judgment? . . . Hence it is my contention that a positive judgment that a miracle has taken place is always a philosophical or theological judgment.

[T]o move beyond such affirmations and to reach the conclusion that God indeed has directly caused this inexplicable event is to cross the line separating the historian from the philosopher or theologian
Similar statements have been made pertaining specifically to Jesus' resurrection (Carnley 1987: 89; Ehrman's opening statements in Ehrman & Licona 2008 and Ehrman & Licona 2009; Theissen & Winter 2002:250) . Since the worldviews of historians play such a prominent role in adjudicating on the historicity of Jesus' resurrection, Allison contends that historians find themselves in a stalemate and must punt to philosophers and theologians (Allison 2005:339-340, 351) . However, it does not prevent him from trying (199 n2; Dunn 2003:878; McCullagh 1984:28; Wedderburn 1999:96) . Therefore, we have two separate arguments: Historians cannot say that 'God performed x' since they have no way of verifying it and the judgement that a miracle occurred requires a theistic worldview that is in conflict with the worldviews of other historians. Therefore, the matter must be placed in the hands of philosophers and theologians. Let us look carefully at each of these arguments.
Historians cannot conclude that God did it, since they have no access to such knowledge & Ehrman 2006:24; Lorenz 1994:312; Tucker 2004:4; Wright 2003:15-16; Zammito 2005:178, cf. 177) . All of these are postulated as inferences from the evidence.
Templeton laureate John Polkinghorne states that as a theoretical physicist he believes that protons and neutrons consist of subatomic particles (e.g. quarks and gluons) although these never have been and probably never will be seen. He asserts that he believes in the occurrences of the Big Bang and biological evolution even though he was not there to witness either. He believes because of phenomena consistent with these being true.
He also believes Jesus' resurrection for the same reason: The extant historical data is most consistent with Jesus' resurrection (Polkinghorne 2005:116-118 (Habermas 2003:4; cf. Habermas 2007:288; Craig 1989:419) . It would be too much to argue on historical grounds that Jesus had a 'resurrection' body as understood by first-century Christians, since that understanding was accompanied by numerous theological implications, such as that Jesus' resurrection was believed to have been the first fruits of the general resurrection that will occur on the last day when God will make everything right, redeem the righteous and condemn the wicked. The fullness of resurrection theology cannot be verified by historical investigation (Eddy & Boyd 2007:88-89; Moltmann 1996:80; Peters 2006:149-169) .
Alan Segal may be correct in asserting that there is insufficient historical evidence to conclude that 'Jesus was actually and physically raised from the dead and that he appeared in his transformed fleshly body' (Segal 2006:136 (Schmidt 1984:78) It may likewise be observed that if the evidence for a miracle such as the resurrection of Jesus occurs in a context that is charged with religious significance, the resurrection hypothesis could be the strongest explanation for the beliefs of the disciples and Paul that Jesus had been raised from the dead and had appeared to them. Meier's position at best mitigates against historians identifying the cause of Jesus' return to life or the precise nature of Jesus' revivified body, but it should not deter historians from adjudicating on the event itself. Ehrman's objection is nuanced. He asserts that the entire exercise of ascertaining whether Jesus rose from the dead is illegitimate for historians because it implies that God did it. This objection confuses historical conclusions with their theological implications. He is doing history backwards. Historians should approach the data neither presupposing nor a priori excluding the possibility of God's acting in raising Jesus. They should then form and weigh hypotheses for the best explanation for that data from a position of openness. Probability ought to be determined in this manner rather than by forming a definition of 'miracle' that excludes the serious consideration of a hypothesis prior to an examination of the data. Moreover, as suggested above, historians often must leave the cause of an event unanswered, although this does not deter them from drawing historical conclusions.
Since worldview plays a major part in the adjudication of miracle claims, historians must leave the matter in the hands of philosophers and theologians
Historical descriptions are almost always heavily influenced by the historian's race, gender, nationality, values, political and religious convictions, concepts of the external world and of the nature of history itself. More often than not, the result is pluralism even in nonreligious matters. A Marxist approach to history, which attempts to explain the past as the result of social movements of working classes rather than rulers, will usually yield historical narratives in conflict with those generated by other approaches. Yet, historians do not suggest that they cannot write histories of the American Revolution or the Vietnam War since a degree of incommensurableness presents itself when Marxist descriptions differ from those provided by non-Marxist historians.
It is both common and necessary for historians, philosophers and theologians to cross disciplines. Historians neglecting to do this may unwittingly produce poor results (Barrera 2001:205; Evans 1999:10; Fischhoff 1982:350; Gilderhus 2007:111-112; Harvey 1996:55-56; Lorenz 1994:298, cf. 312; McIntyre 2001:7; 14; Shaw 2001:9; Vann 2004 3) . Philosopher of history J.H. Hexter notes the lack of dialogue between philosophers and historians with the result that some historians have 'a rather special gift for leaping aboard intellectually sinking ships and drawing their innocent followers along with them' (Hexter 1971:110 (Stump 1989:371 Broad examples where the marriage of disciplines occurs are readily at hand. Archaeologists are significantly assisted in piecing together a detailed history of their sites through a study of the ancient texts describing them. When a biblical scholar studies the pathological effects of scourging and crucifixion from medical professionals in order to gain insights into Jesus' death, it is doubtful he or she would be accused of stepping outside of his or her capacity as a historian. Philosophers of science must have an understanding of the principles of science.
Professional historians also cross disciplines. Philosopher of history J.L. Gorman speaks of debates among historians concerning whether the meaning of historical truth is a matter for historians or philosophers (Gorman 2000:253) . Rex Martin, another philosopher of history, comments that historians always 'make philosophical presuppositions' when writing their books and adds that 'historians need philosophy to do their work as historians better' (Martin 2006:253, 260) . In fact, historians always make numerous philosophical assumptions before entering every historical investigation. For example, they assume the external world is real. They assume our senses provide a fairly accurate perception of the external world. They assume logic facilitates us in our quest for truth rather than merely being a pragmatic tool aimed at our survival and quality of life. They assume natural laws in effect today were in effect in antiquity and that they operated in a similar manner. More importantly, the majority of historians assume that history is at least partially knowable (McCullagh 1984:1) . Whereas the vast majority of all historians agree on most of these assumptions, a number of postmodernists take issue with some of them, especially the last. For these, not only is a historical judgement on miracle claims out of the question, so is a judgement on every other past event.
Yet, this does not keep realist historians from making historical judgements. Each of the five assumptions just mentioned is purely philosophical in nature. While good reasons exist for holding a realist view of history over a postmodern approach, at the end of the day, realist and postmodernist positions are based on assumptions that cannot be defended to a point beyond all doubt. I suggest that it is unreasonable to require a consensus before awarding historicity because the horizons of historians often prevent such consensus even in nonreligious matters. This is because the horizon of the historian will certainly impact his or her conclusions. Although this challenge is ever present in historical Jesus studies, it is not unique to it, since it is likewise present in historical inquiries involving matters of race, gender, ethics, nationality and politics. This is readily acknowledged by historians outside of the community of biblical scholars.
Philosopher of History Richard Evans writes:
We Therefore, I think Craffert is mistaken when he asserts that 'no one has the right to use the tag historical unless it can win the respect of fellow historians' (Craffert 1989:341-343) . If historians outside of the community of biblical scholars are within their professional rights in drawing conclusions on nonreligious matters in the absence of consensus, why do some biblical scholars suggest that consensus is required when horizons have an even greater influence in religious matters?
Indeed, Ehrman is inconsistent in his application of his own rule.
Since the Qur'an states that Jesus was not killed in the first century (Q 4:157-158), Muslim historians deny Jesus' execution by Pilate and instead believe that God spared him from death, despite very strong evidence to the contrary. Moreover, a handful of scholars on the periphery question whether the historical Jesus even existed, let alone whether he was crucified or not. And yet, the lack of consensus does not deter Ehrman from concluding that Jesus died by crucifixion (Ehrman 2000:162; 2008:235, 261-262) . When the worldviews or hypercritical approaches of particular historians get in the way of their practice, more sober-minded historians are not thwarted from arriving at firm conclusions. Habermas contends: (Habermas 2007:286) Given the prominent role of the horizons of historians in every historical inquiry, we can anticipate that consensus opinions will often elude historians as a result of 'interpretive polarities' (Martin 1998:28) . Philosopher of history Peter Novick states that it is 'impossible to locate' a 'scholarly consensus . . . to sustain objectivity' (Novick 1988:572) while Anchor, another philosopher of history, warns that 'there are many, sometimes incompatible, interpretations of the same events' and 'there is no guarantee of consensus in history' (Anchor 1999:113) .
[S]ince when is convincing a person of the opposite persuasion a prerequisite for arguing that one's view is fairly indicated by the data? Is it not the case that the opposite could also be said with assurance? How likely is it that the argument constructed by a skeptic or agnostic would convince a believer against his/her position? I doubt that either side wants this to be a prerequisite for their rationality!
Unfortunately, rather than an objective and careful weighing of the data, the subjective horizons of historians, especially those of historians writing on religious, philosophical, political and moral topics, exert great influence in their final judgements (Denton 2004:89) . Moreover, many members of the audience to whom historians present their research are no less biased. Accordingly, what is judged as sound and persuasive research to one group may be viewed as inadequate and overly biased by another. Anchor writes:
As there are always alternative ways to interpret the traces of the past (our evidence), an essential part of the historian's task is to figure out which among them is best, that is, which among them is most likely to be true." Which explanation seems "most plausible" varies not only with the cognitive expectations but also with the normative expectations of the audiences that are being addressed. (Anchor 1999:114; cf. Swinburne 2003:3) I have engaged in a number of public debates on the question of the historicity of Jesus' resurrection. In 2008 I debated with Bart Ehrman, a biblical scholar whom I respect. We enjoyed a debate where we exchanged ideas and offered criticisms of the other's view in a collegial manner. A number of Christians present approached me afterwards and told me they believed I clearly won the debate. However, I know of two others who had attended and who commented that I clearly had lost. The horizons of some audience members impacted their ability to judge the debate.
The election for president of the United States recently took place. A number of televised debates between the final candidates took place and it was very interesting to hear the comments of the political pundits following the debates. Liberals and conservatives alike declared clear victories for their candidates and none were willing to acknowledge valid points made by the candidate representing the opposing party. It is certain that many were placing a 'spin' on the results in order to promote their view. However, it is likewise certain that pundits on both sides sincerely believed that their candidate won the debate. Our horizons impact our objectivity far more than most of us realise or acknowledge. A consensus can be reached as a result of shared biases, convictions, objectives and a lack of knowledge. We need to be reminded every so often that a consensus of scholars does not establish the objectivity or truth of their conclusion. Communities in the past have held numerous beliefs that have since been disproved (Evans 1999:99; Tucker 2004:24-25) . Crossan seems wise when writing, 'I think it's the job of a scholar to take on the majority every now and then' (comments by Crossan in Copan 1998:46).
It is highly unlikely that a consensus will ever exist pertaining to the historicity of a miracle claim such as the resurrection of Jesus. While strong agreement exists regarding a number of 'facts' often used as evidence to support the resurrection hypothesis, no consensus will ever exist for the conclusion that the resurrection hypothesis is an accurate description of what actually occurred. After all, how likely is it that historians who are Muslims and atheists will confess that the resurrection hypothesis is the best explanation or that Christian historians will confess that the resurrection hypothesis is not the best explanation? Yet, either Jesus rose from the dead or he did not; and historians holding one of these positions are more correct than those not holding it.
Accordingly, O'Collins is mistaken when writing:
If (Meyer 1994:133-134) 
MIRACLE CLAIMS IN MULTIPLE RELIGIONS
Hume contended that testimonies of miracles in one religion are weighed against an infinite number of witnesses who testify of miracle claims in other religions. Therefore, these cancel out each other (Hume 2000 (Hume (1777 : 127). Ehrman argues that if we accept that Jesus performed miracles, we must also 'be willing in principle to concede that other people did them as well' (Ehrman 2008:242; comments by Ehrman in Craig & Ehrman 2006 :22. See also Craffert 1989 Lindars 1986:91; Segal 2006:136) . He provides as examples Muhammad, Apollonius of Tyana, Honi the CircleDrawer, Hanina ben Dosa, and the Roman Emperor Vespasian. "The evidence that is admitted in any one of these cases must be admitted in the others as well" (Ehrman 2008:242, 269 4.45; 6.43) and Origen noted that Moiregenes had referred to Apollonius as a 'magician and philosopher' (magou kai philosophos), that he had 'magical power' (magaios) and was a 'swindler/imposter' (goēta) (Contra Celsum 6.41.5-10).
Whereas several plausible explanations exist for most miracle claims, this may not be the case for others. We may not be assured that Honi and Hanina actually performed deeds regarded as miracles by witnesses. However, there is wide scholarly agreement that Jesus performed deeds that both he and others regarded as exorcisms and miracles (Licona 2009 ). And there is evidence that Apollonius and Vespasian performed miracles; however, we may interpret what actually occurred. My objective here is not to argue that a miracle hypothesis is more plausible than a naturalistic theory posited for the reports of Jesus' miracles. Instead, I have attempted to demonstrate that historians who regard the miracles of Jesus as historical need not acknowledge the historicity of the miracles from other religions given the disparity of evidence between them. Miracle reports should be examined on a case-by-case basis (Crossley 2005:181) . If it turns out that there are good reasons for holding to the historicity of a particular miracle claim, there is no a priori reason for withholding a positive verdict from it because poorly evidenced miracle claims exist.
I wish to make one further comment pertaining to Ehrman's contention. He asserts that Christians reject miracle claims in other religions because they do not agree with their particular religious or philosophical beliefs (comments by Ehrman in Craig & Ehrman 2006:33-34) . This argument commits the genetic fallacy. It is certain that Christians, those of other faiths, agnostics and atheists often hold certain beliefs and reject others for poor reasons. But this does not warrant the conclusion that those beliefs are mistaken. A Christian may believe that Jesus of Nazareth performed deeds he and others believed were miracles because it is reported in a text he believes is inspired by God. Although this would be a poor reason for a historian to arrive at the conclusion that Jesus was a miracle worker, it does not warrant the conclusion that historians cannot weigh the data and arrive at the same conclusion as those who get there by other means.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article I have examined three common objections to the investigation of miracle claims by historians: the theological objection, lack of consensus and miracle claims in multiple religions. I argued that all three can be rather easily answered. When combined with the contentions in my previous article, namely, the positive case I presented that historians are within their professional rights in investigating miracle claims and the failure of two additional objections to this contention, I am suggesting that a paradigm shift should occur within the community of biblical scholars and that those historians investigating miracle claims are within their professional rights in doing so.
